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RELATIONSHIP OF A JUROR TO A PERSON
INJURED BY THE COMMISSION OF A
CRIME AS GROUNDS FOR CHALLENGE
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury. ... (Emphasis added.) The fairness
of trial by jury depends upon the impartiality of the jurors selected. It is
the foremost object of the law to secure as jurors men whose minds are
wholly free from bias-actual or implied.' Implied bias is that which is
imputed in law to the prospective juror regardless of any actual partiality.2
It is the purpose of this article to examine one ground of implied bias
for which a juror is subject to challenge in a criminal case, i.e. the relation-
ship, either by affinity or consanguinity, to the prosecuting witness, the
person injured by the crime, or the deceased.
COMMON LAW
Before proceeding, it is advisable that brief attention be paid to the
matter of implied bias as a ground for challenge at common law. Many
of the rules pertaining to the competency of jurors had been derived from
the canon law scheme of "exceptions to witnesses."a An interest in the
litigation was one of several general grounds of incompetency.
4
Blackstone mentions two types of challenges: principal cause and to
the favor.5 The former was used where the facts imported actual bias, for
example consanguinity or affinity of a juror to either party within the ninth
degree.6 These challenges are discussed by Blackstone in his section on
civil trials. However, at a later point he states that challenges in criminal
I. State v. Hatfield, 48 W. Va. 561, 37 S.E. 626 (1900); State v. Dushman, 79
W. Va. 747, 91 S.E. 809 (1917).
2. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936). Implied bias is "such bias as,
when the existence of the facts is ascertained, does in judgment of law disqualify the
juror." N.Y. CRIM. CODE § 376 (1945).
3. See 2 POLLACK & MArLAND, HISTORY or ENcLisu LAw 621 (2d ed. 1923);
PLUCKNETT, A CoNcisr HIsTORY OF -riE COMxoN LAw ch. 4 (2d ed. 1936) for a
discussion of the history of the jury system.
4. 9 HOLoSWORT, HISTORY OF ENCLISn LAW 193 (5th ed. 1944). Nowhere
are specific grounds mentioned, and this field is too general to draw any concrete
conclusions as to specific grounds of incompetency.
5. 3 BLACKSTONE, COIMENTARIES *363. Challenges to the favor exist where
the party has no principal challenge, but objects only to some probable circumstances
of suspicion, such as acquaintance; the validity of this challenge must he left to the
judge. This challenge is not within the scope of this comment.
6. Ibid.
7. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352.
8. 3 BLACKSTONE, Op. cit. supra note 5, at 363.
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cases may be made for the same reasons as in civil cases Blackstone makes
no mention of a juror's relationship to the injured party as a ground for
challenge,' and if such a rule existed, it is not clear why lie omitted it.t
THIE LAW TODAY
A) Non-Statutory
Subject to "constitutional limitations' it is within the power of the
legislature to prescribe the qualifications of jurors and grounds for chal-
lenging them.' Hlf of the states1'2 are presently without statutes which
declare relationship to the prosecuting witness, to the party injured by
the offense, or to the deceased as a ground for challenging a juror. \When
the problem arises in these states, the courts are faced with the question
of what precedent is applicablec. Several courts have relied on the common
law, basing their decisions on the rule that a juror related within the ninth
degree to a party is subject to challenge.' 4 These courts have held that
for the purposes of a criminal trial, the person injured by the offense
must be considered a party.' Courts basing their decisions on common
law precedents have failed to explain the complete absence of a specific
rule of challenge on this point.
9. From an examination of the above cited authorities, the author feels it is
safe to conclude that there existed at common law no specific ground for the challenge
of jurors because of relationship to the prosecuting witness, person injured by the offense,
or the deceased. Accord, State v. Itilton, 87 S.C. 434, 69 S.E. 1077 (1911).
]0. US. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, 'No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (a statute of West Virginia dis-
qualifying negroes from acting as jurors because of their race was held unconstitutional
as violative of the fourteenth amendment); see also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1952); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286-287 (1950); State v. Peoples, 131 N.C.
784, 42 S.E. 814 (1902).
11. Ex parte Mana, 178 Cal. 213, 172 Pac. 986 (1918) (legislature had the right
to provide that women serve as jurors); Walter v. State, 208 Ind. 231, 195 N.E. 268
(1935)(the qualifications of jurors is a matter of legislative control); Palmer v. State,
197 Ind. 625, 150 N.E. 917 (1926); People v. Barltz, 212 Mich. 580, 180 N.W. 423
(1920).
12. These states are: Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin. Neither the United States Code, Statutes
at Large or the Federal Rulcs of Criminal Procedure have any such statute.
13. The courts are faced with this problem because of the confusion concerning
the existence of a common law rule in point. See 3 BIACKSTON, CoalIME NTAR1I.t:s *363;
4 BtACKSTOrNx, COMNr IEN'ARIES *352; 9 I1or.nswoRTni, hISTORY OF ENrr.rsir LAw 193
(5th ed. 1955); PLucKzrirr, A CoNciSE lIsOrov F rie CoMMON LAW ch. 4 (2d. ed.
1936); 2 PoiuAcx & MAIT.ANo, ]HsrORY oF 1NGi.IS LAw 621 (2d ed. 1923).
14. 3 BLACxSTONE, COMEI-:NTAInIS *363.
15. State v. Williams, 9 lloust. 508, 18 Atl. 949 (Del. 1890); Smith v. State,
3 Ca. 574, 59 S.E. 311 (1907); State v. Thomas, 351 Mo. 804, 174 S.V.2d 337
(1943); State v. Miller, 331 Mo. 675, 56 S.W.2d 92 (1932). The influence of Black-
stone's statement that challenges in criminal cases may he made for the same reasons
as in civil cases is apparent. 4 BL.ACKSTONE, COI-IrNTrARirS *352.
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Courts in other states have held that due to the absence of a common
law rule regarding this ground of challenge,' a juror will not be subject
to challenge because of a relationship to the injured party. 17
Both of the foregoing court-created theories have lost sight of the funda-
mental idea underlying the existence of the right to challenge jurors-
to guarantee the accused a fair and impartial trial by a jury of his peers.' 8
Decisions based upon these theories are completely arbitrary.
A more reasonable approach has been expressed in cases holding that
it is within the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether the
particular juror is subject to challenge."' The judge's decision should rest
on the probability of bias arising from the particular relationship and the
surrounding circumstances. .'? In United States v. Banmiller2' the juror was
the sister-in-law of the injured complainant. They were acquainted, but
never met socially nor were they connected in any business way; they had
never discussed the case with each other. The trial judge, after a bearing,2 2
concluded that the relationship did not affect the juror's consideration of
the case and there was no ground for challenge.
Discretion vested in the trial judge has resulted in the attainment of
16. State v. Hilton, 87 S.C. 434, 69 S.E. 1077 (1911).
17. Duke v. State, 257 Ala. 339, 58 So.2d 764 (1952); Anderson v. State, 30
Ala. App. 124, 2 So.2d 461 (1941); State v. Oliver, 193 La. 1084, 192 So. 725 (1939)
(relationship of step-brothers existing between prosecuting witness and juror not a
ground for challenge. The author feels this is an excellent example of the arbitrary
dcisions,reached by these courts); State v. Chandler, 178 La. 7, 150 So. 386 (1933);
State v. Phillips, 164 La. 597, 114 So. 171 (1927).
18. This idea is expressed in State v. Hatfield. 48 W. Va. 561, 37 S.E. 626 (1900);
State v. Dushman, 79 W. Va. 747, 91 S.E. 809 (1917).
19. State v. Haney, 186 La. 465, 172 So. 528 (1937); State v. Carricut, 157 La.
140, 102 So. 98 (1924); State v. Scarborough, 152 La. 669, 94 So. 204 (1922);
State v. Lewis, 323 Mo. 1070, 20 S.W.2d 529 (1929); State v. Gregory, 172 S.C.
329, 174 S.E. 10 (1934).
20. State v. Haney, 186 La. 465, 172 So. 528 (1937) (juror's wife was second
cousin of prosecutrix, but because of his substantial standing in the community and
reputation for honesty, the juror was not disqualified); State v. Scarborough, 152 La.
669, 94 So. 204 (1922).
21. 248 F.2d 303 (3d cir. 1957).
22. Upon the accused's motion for a new trial on ground that he was denied
an impartial trial, the court held a hearing to determine if such was the case. The
following testimony was given by the juror at the hearing:
Q. Mrs. Degler, the fact that you were related to the man who was victimized
in this robbery, did that prejudice your vote in any way in this case?
A. No, it did not.
Q. Did you bring back your verdict of guilty on the evidence as presented
in the court; is that how you based your verdict, I mean, on what you
heard in court?
A. On what I heard, yes, that is the way.
Q. And the fact that your brother-in-law was the one who was robbed had
nothing to do with it?
A. It did not.
Based on the hearing, and upon the fact that the juror was a housewife serving
as a juror for the first time, the trial judge felt there was no fraud on her part
and was convinced of her impartiality, IHis decision was upheld on appeal.. United
States v. Banumiller, 248 F.2d 303, 306 (3d cir. 1957).
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the basic objective of this theory-to impanel a fair and impartial jury,
free from arbitrary exclusions ]ot salctioned by statute
B) Statutory
There are twenty-four states with statutes holding certain relation-
ships to the injured party or to the prosecuting witness to be ground fot
challenge because of implied bias.'- A singlc basic pattcrll is formed by
these statutes, differing only in the degree of relationslhip required. The
span of relationship ranges from that of third degreeC' to "any kin." 6
The appareiit basis of the "degree designation" is found in the common
law rule of relationship to a party within the ninth degree. 2 This has been
increased or decreased in proportion to the legislature's, fear of bias stem-
ruing frons the relationship. It is nevertheless difficult to justify the extension
of this rule to include "any kinl," regardless of how great the fear of bias
may be.
Since the forms of these statutes do not vary materially, it is sufficient
to look at a single example. The New York statute 'N provides:
Grounds of challenge for implied bias.
A challenge for implied bias may be taken for all or any of
the following causes, and for no other: 1. Consanguinity or
affinity within the ninth degree, to the person alleged to be injured
by the crime charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was
instituted, or to the defendant; ...
23. The author bases his opinion on the results reached in the following cases:
United States v. Banmiller, 248 F.2d 303 (3d cir. 1957); State v. Scarborough, 152 La.
669, 94 So. 204 (1922).
24. Ala.: mAA. CODE ANN. tit. 30 § 55 (1940); Ark.: ARK. STAT. § 43- 1920
1947); Cal.: CAL. PFNAL CODE-' § 1074 (1953); Fla.: FLA. S'vr. ANN. § 913.03
1943); Ga.: GA. COD. ANN. § 59_716 (1935); Idaho: IDA1bo CODE ANN. § 2020
(1947); Ind.: I)n. ANN. STAT. § 9- 1504 (1956); Iowa: IOWA ConE ANN. § 779.5
1950); Kan.: KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. eh. 62 art. 1406 (1949); Ky.: Ky. Acirs OF CEN.
ASSEMsLY Ch. 87 § 1 (1956); Mmin.: NtINN. SrA'r. ANN. § 631.31 (1945); Mo.: Mo.
ANN. S'rT. § 546.120 (Vernon 1949); Mont.: MONT. Ri.;'. CoDi:s ANN. § 94-7120
(1947); Neb.: Ni.n. REV. STAT. § 29-2006 (1956); Nev.: Nv. Come. LAws § 10946
(1929)- N.Y.: N.Y. CRIxI. CODE § 377 (1945); N.).: N.D. Rm'. CooE § 1736 (1943);
Ohio: 6mo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.25 (Baldwin 1953); Okla.: OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 660
S1937); Ore.: OREi,. REv. S'rT. § 136.220 f1953); Tex.: T.X. CoolE CRuo. PRoc. Ch.
art. 616 (Vernon 1941); Utah: Umi CODE ANN. § 77- 30-19 (1953); XWash.:WASH. REV. CoDE § 4.44.180 (1951); Wyo.: WYO. CoMP. SEAT. ANN. § 10.1104 (1945).
25. Florida and Texas use third degree as their basis.







26. Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, and Washington place no limit
upon the degree of relationship.
27. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMIME.NTARIrS *363
28. N.Y. CRIM. CODE § 377 (1945).
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(1) Computation of Degree of Relationship
The civil law method of calculation is used to determine the degree
of relationship. 2 B, this method "reckoning" is taken from the person in
question upward to the common ancestor and then down again to the other
related party. 30 The matter of determining a juror's degree of relationship
has not been difficult.a'
(2) Consanguinity and Affinity
Consanguinity implies blood relation through a common ancestor and
may be lincal or collateral. :"-' The courts have had more difficulty in deter-
mining the existence of a relationship by affinity which concerns a tie
between the blood relations of one spouse and the other spouse a.3 3 Each
spouse is related by affinity to the blood relations of the other spouse
in the same degree as the latter, but (and this is the point of confusion)
the blood relations of one spouse are not, by virtue of the marriage,
related by affinity to the blood relations of the other spouse.'14
Put more simply:
The bride and groom come within the circle of the others kin.
But kin and kin are no more related than they were before.3 5
Thus, wherc a juror's son had married a member of the same family in
which members of the prosecuting witness's family had married, it was
held that no relationship by affinity had been created and the juror was
not subject to challenge on that ground.?
(3) Problems
These enactments have failed to solve several existing problems; 7
the first and most troublesome of which concerns a juror who is unaware
that he is within the prohibited degree of relationship until after the verdict.
The second problem is whether a juror related by affinity within the
prohibited degree is subject to challenge when the relationship has been
dissolved before the trial.
29. Duke v. State, 257 Ala. 339, 58 So.2d 764 (1952); Smith v. State, 62 Ga.
App. 494, 8 S.E. 2d 663 (1940); Watkins v. State, 125 Ga. 143, 53 S.E. 1024 (1906);"
State v. Thomas, 351 Mo. 804, 174 S.W.2d 337 (1943).
30. Watkins v. State, 125 Ga. 143, 53 S.E. 1024 (1906); 2 BIACKSTONE,
COIMENTARIES *207.
31. Clear and extensive charts tracing the degrees of relationship are presented in
2 BI.ACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *207 and ATKINSON, W n.i.s 46 (2d ed. 1953).
32. 26 AM. JUR., Husband 6 Wife § 2 (1938).
33. Ibid.
34. State v. Wall, 41 Fla. 26 So. 1020 (1899); 26 AM. JUR., Husband 6 Wife
§ 2 (1938).
35. Owens v. State, 177 Miss. 488, 171 So. 345 (1936).
36, Thornsbery v. State, 192 Ark. 435, 92 S.V.2d 203 (1936); See Duke v. State,
257 Ala. 334, 58 So.2d 764 (1952); Garrett v. State, 203 Ca. 756, 48 S.E.2d 377
(1948); Owens v. State, 177 Miss. 488, 171 So. 345 (1936); State v. Thomas, 351 Mo.
804, 174 SAV.2d 337 (1943).
37. It should be noted that these problems also exist in the absence of statute.
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DISQUALIFYING RELATIONSHIP UNKNOWN To JuRoR
The court decisions are in conflict where a juror is ignorant of his
relationship within the prohibited degree to the person injured. This
conflict exists in states having statutes setting forth grounds for challenge
based on implied bias-' and in states without such statutes.8 9
Courts holding that a juror is subject to challenge who is within the
prohibited degree, but ignorant of the relationship base their decisions on
the possible dangers involved in setting a precedent allowing such jurors
to serve.
40
The court in Crawley v. State4' argued;
It would be too dangerous a precedent to allow the juror to assert
that lie was ignorant of the relationship till after trial. The prin-
cipal on which the law rejects him is that lie is not impartial; the
same objection lies to his assertion that he was ignorant of the
relationship at the time of trial, after he had assisted in the con-
viction.
Courts also refuse to recognize that the juror is unaware of the relationship;
the law is deaf to his explanations.42
The majority of courts adhere to the belief that the juror who is ignorant
of the relationship until after the verdict is not subject to challenge.
Underlying these decisions is the theory stated by the court in State v.
Miller13 wherein the juror was related within the fourth degree to the
deceased, and by such relationship was disqualified by statute.4 4 However,
the juror was unaware of the relationship until after the verdict of con-
viction had been rendered. In holding that the juror was not subject to
challenge because of the relationship, the court said that while the fact
of relationship subjects a juror to challenge it is really the knowledge of
such fact by the juror which may be expected to result in bias. The court
could not understand how the relationship could have resulted in bias
where such relationship was unknown until after the verdict. In Miracle v.
Commonwealth4r the court stated that where a juror did not know of his
relationship to the deceased he stood in the same position as a complete
38. See statutes cited note 24 supra.
39. See note 26 supra.
40. State v. Williams, 9 lloust. 508, 18 Atl. 949 (Dcl. 1890); Crawley v. State,
151 Ca. 818, 108 S.E. 238 (1921); Merritt v. State, 1Q2 Ga. 405, 110 S.E. 160 (1921);
Smith v. State, 151 Ca. 818, 108 S.E. 238 (1921); Ledford v. State, 75 Ca. 856 (1885);
Garner v. State, 76 Miss. 515, 25 So. 363 (1889); Page v. State, 22 Tex. App. 551,
3 S.W. 745 (1886).
41. 151 Ga. 818, 825, 108 S.E. 238, 241 (1921).
42. Smith v. State, 3 Ga. 574, 59 S.E. 311 (1907).
43. 331 Mo. 675, 56 S.W.2d 92 (1932).
44. Mo. REV. S'Ar. § 3668 (1929).
45. 148 Ky. 453, 146 S.W. 1136 (1912); the court further stated that it is the
knowledge of the relationship and the resultant feeling that causes the disqualification
and where the knowledge is absent, the disqualification disappears.
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stranger the judgment of the juror could not have been affected by a cir-
cuistanec of which he had not the slightest knowledge.
If consideration is given to the fundamental theory underlying the
right to challenge jurors,46 the logic of State v. Miller47 and cases sup-
porting this theory48 is compelling. The author is hard pressed to under-
stand how a man's decision could be biased by a relationship of which
he is not aware.
The dangers arising from the application of this theory, as expressed
by its opponents,4 would be greatly lessened if the judge would conduct
an extensive hearing and careful examination of the facts. A court deter-
mination that lack of knowledge of the relationship existed would appear
to compel a holding that the juror is not subject to challenge.
REIATIONSInP By AFFINITY As AFEcTED BY DISSOLUTION OF TnE MARRIACE
A) Dissolution by Death
It is the general rule that where the disqualifying relationship of a
juror is based upon marriage the death of the other spouse removes such
disqualification. " The reason for this rule is that the entire structure of
relationship by affinity is based on a subsisting marriage, not a dissolved
one.5 1 However the court in Spear v. Robinson5 '2 held that relationship by
affinity is not lost on the dissolution of the marriage any more than blood
relationship is lost by the death of those from whom it is derived.
Where issue survives, the relationship by affinity continues regardless
of the death of a spouse.5  Consequently a juror subject to challenge
because of affinity remains so even after the marriage is dissolved as long
as there is surviving issue.
5 4
46. See cases cited note 18 supra; this idea is to enable the accused to be tried by
a wholly impartial jury composed of men whose minds are free from bias.
47. 331 Mo. 675, 56 S.V.2d 92 (1932).
48. State v. Fox, 52 Idaho 474, 16 P.2d 663 (1932); Reed v. Comm., 273 Ky.
607, 117 S.W.2d 589 (1938); Miller v. Comm. 203 Ky. 437, 262 S.W. 579 (1924);
Miracle v. Comm. 148 Ky. 453, 146 S.W. 1136 (1912); Blunfield v. State, 102 Miss.
610, 59 So. 849 (1912); State v. Miller, 331 N. 675, 56 S.W.2d 92 (1932); State v.
Steward, 296 Mo. 12, 246 S.V. 936 (1922) Traviss v. Comm., 106 Pa. 597 (1884);
State v. Congdon, 14 R.I. 458 (1884); Hamilton v. State, 101 Tenn. 417, 47 SV.
695 (1898); Rogers v. State, 109 Tex. Crim. 88, 3 S.W.2d 455 (1927).
49. See cases cited Note 40 subra.
50. Harnage v. State, 7 Ga. App. 573, 67 S.E. 694 (1910); Garner %,. State,
6 Ga. App. 788, 65 S.E. 842 (1909); Gillespie v. State, 168 Ind. 298, 80 N.E. 829
(1907), There was no mention of the effect of surviviog issue of such marriage in these
cases.
51. Diebold v. Diebold, 235 Mo. App. 83, 1-1I S.\V.2d 119 (1940).
52, 29 Me, 531 (1849).
53. Shamburger v. State, 221 Ala. 538, 130 So. 70 (1930).
54. Shamburger v. State, 221 Ala. 538, 130 So. 70 (1930); Walsinghan v. State,
61 Fla. 67, 56 So. 195 (1911); Miller v. State, 97 Ga. 653, 25 S.E. 366 (1895); State
v. Shaw, 25 N.C. 532 (1843); Stringfcllow v. State, 42 'Vex. Crim. 588, 61 S.WV 719
(1901)
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13) Dissolution of Marriage Other Than by Death
The author has been unable to find any case wherein a court decided
the effect upon the disqualifying relationship by affinity of a juror where
the marriage was not dissolved by death."
Dicta in Crosby v. State"' appears to indicate that the result would be
the same had the marriage been dissolved by divorce. The court stated:
If the marriage on account of which such relationship exists, be
dissolved by death or othenvise, the relationship in contemplation
of law ceases to exist, unless issue of such marriage survives.
(Emphasis added.)
The court further indicated that the burden of proof was on the party
challeiging the juror to show that the spouse was still living, and the
marriage was otherwise undissolved. No definite statement can be made
in the absence of an actual decision on the point.
CONCLUSION
Courts which have relied solely upon common law precedents to
establish grounds for challenging jurors have reachcd arbitrary results. There
is no sound basis for the automatic disqualification of a juror because of a
remote relationship to the party injured. Nor is there a sound basis for
refusal to exclude a juror who is very probably biased merely because
grounds for his exclusion did not exist at common law. It is this strict
adherence to an inflexible standard which has resulted in arbitrary de-
cisions. Where discretion has been left with the trial judge to determine
a juror's bias the results have been more reasonable. The judge is not
bound by rigid standards. The particular relationship and the surrounding
circumstances guide the judge's discretion in each individual case. It is
the author's belief that this method should be adopted by all states lacking
statutes concerning implied bias as a ground for challenge.
The existing legislation leaves much to be desired. Extension of the
prohibitory relationship to "any kin" is unrealistic. It is submitted that
relationship within the fourth degree should be set up as an absolute
basis of exclusion. Discretion should be left to the trial judge in cases
involving jurors related within the fifth to ninth degrees. This would
rcducc arbitrary exclusions.
The legislatures havc lcfruntouched the varicd problems which have
arisen, such as that of a juror within the prohibited degree of relationship
but unaware of this fact mall after the verdict, and the problem of a
55. Aimot., 117 A.L.R. 805 (1938).
56. 90 Hla, 381, 106 So. 741 (1925).
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juror related by affinity within the prohibited degree when the marriage
has been dissolved before the trial.
Legislatures attempting to solve these problems must always keep
in mind the fundamental theory underlying the right to challenge jurors-
the guarantee to the accused of a fair and impartial trial by a jury
of his peers.
MURRAY GOLDMAN
